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Introduction
Lobbying is a primary avenue through which …rms attempt to change economic policy in the United States, with total expenditures outnumbering campaign contributions by a factor of nine. While lobbying by businesses is a frequently debated issue in popular discourse, there is little systematic empirical evidence on these behaviors at the …rm level. We build a matched data set on …rms'lobbying expenditures and operations to study the determinants of …rm lobbying over time. We …nd signi…cant evidence for the existence of up-front costs that are associated with beginning to lobby. These costs a¤ect …rms'decisions of whether or not to invest in the political process over time and in ‡uence how they react to changes in the policy environment. Moreover, …rms that are already lobbying show a signi…cant propensity and ability to adjust their e¤orts to maximize pro…ts. We hope that our …ndings will help guide future work in political economy and inform debates over the role of large corporations in in ‡uencing policy decisions.
Prior empirical work on …rm participation in the policy making process has su¤ered signi…cantly from data constraints. Most of the available evidence that we do have comes from data on campaign contributions. These contributions often come from Political Action Committees (PACs), which can be set up and organized by …rms but which must raise money from voluntary donations from individuals. 2 These studies have addressed such questions as the correlation between political activity and …rm size as well as the e¤ect that contributions have on a …rm's stock market price. 3 Little work has been done, however, either empirically or theoretically, in looking at the determinants of …rm e¤orts in a dynamic context. With the exception of Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011), the empirical literature on the political economy of international labor movements is also quite thin. 4 The idea that there are up-front costs to engaging in the political process, however, has a long history. Salamon and Siegfried (1977) cite evidence from Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) to argue that ". . . …rm size is an important determinant of the political activity of executives, since the executives of large …rms could a¤ord the luxury of hiring sta¤s and taking the time to inform themselves about policy issues. What makes the absolute size of available resources, and hence …rm size, so important politically is the fact that political involvement has certain …xed costs attached to it. . . "More recently, Bombardini (2008) has developed a model in which up-front costs a¤ect …rms'decisions of whether or not to lobby. She uses data on campaign contributions to demonstrate that her approach …ts the data on the industry-level structure of tari¤s better than prior models. Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Masters and Keim (1985) also consider the e¤ects of these costs.
To shed light on these issues, we match data on …rms'lobbying expenditures with other aspects of their operations. These data exhibit several striking features. The …rst is that few …rms lobby, even in our sample of publicly traded …rms-only 10% of the …rms in our sample engage in lobbying in one or more years over our sample period of 1998-2006. Lobbying is also strongly related to …rm size. This is especially true at the extensive margin of whether or not …rms lobby, but less so at the intensive margin of how much …rms spend on lobbying once the decision has been made to participate in the process. Finally, we …nd that lobbying status is highly persistent over time. The probability that a …rm lobbies in the current year given that it lobbied in the previous year is 92%.
Given the stability of these facts over time, we consider the idea of whether they are driven by up-front costs that are associated with beginning to lobby. Such costs could include: learning the complex laws about lobbying; educating newly hired lobbyists about the details of the …rm's interests, characteristics, and vulnerabilities; developing a lobbying agenda; researching what potential allies and opponents are lobbying for; and investigating how best to attempt to a¤ect the political process (e.g., in which policy makers to invest). 5 To the extent that lobbying represents a legislative subsidy to sympathetic policy makers (Deardor¤ and Hall 2006) , politicians may also require such an initial investment of resources to signal a …rm's willingness to support them over time. The qualitative literature on lobbying has long stressed the importance of establishing continuing relationships with policy makers for the e¤ectiveness of lobbying e¤orts. If the bene…ts from lobbying then fall disproportionately on large …rms, then only these companies will have the incentive to pay this up-front cost.
To test these ideas, we construct a dynamic empirical model of …rm lobbying behavior. This approach implies an estimating equation for the probability that a given …rm lobbies in a particular year. In this model …rms have to pay a one-time sunk cost when they begin to lobby. These costs then create an option value associated with continuing to lobby that alters …rms'intertemporal decisions. Once …rms get in to the political process, they tend to stay in because they would prefer not to spend the money to set up a lobbying operation again in the near future. When we take the model to the data, we …nd strong evidence for the existence of these entry costs. Even after accounting for a number of other factors that would drive …rm behavior, we see that these up-front costs exert a signi…cant in ‡uence on …rm decisions over time.
To further test these predictions, we then look in depth at a speci…c policy shift that has been the subject of signi…cant public debate: the dramatic decline in the limit on H-1B visas that occurred in 2004. This decline was due to the expiration of prior legislation and o¤ers a special natural experiment (e.g., Kato and Sparber 2011). Constructing a smaller panel of …rms that are likely to be responsive to changes in immigration policy, we show that this event precipitated a signi…cant shift in …rms'lobbying behavior for those that had lobbied previously for other issues. The manner in which this adjustment occurs indicates little constraint on shifts across issues important for …rms. At the same time, we …nd that changes in the cap had little e¤ect on the extensive margin of lobbying; the decline in the limit on H-1B visas did not induce new …rms to begin to lobby. We consider the large shift in the intensive margin relative to that of the extensive margin as corroborating evidence for the existence of these barriers to entry.
Our paper contributes to the nascent empirical literature on lobbying and represents one of the …rst to study lobbying behavior at the …rm level. Our results argue that the dynamic nature of lobbying status is a feature that should be included in both future theoretical and empirical work. Selection into lobbying is driven by a number of distinct factors, and studies that fail to address this issue will …nd biased results. This applies to a wide range of topics, from the impact of lobbying on …rm performance to the determinants of trade protectionism. More generally, we contribute to understanding the microfoundations of how political institutions function. Understanding these foundations is crucial for a number of questions in political economy. 6 Entry costs can e¤ectively "…x the players in the game" with respect to the set of …rms engaged in the process. These costs can thus in ‡uence policy choices by altering the composition of …rms that lobby on issues. In particular, the persistence induced by these costs likely allows …rms and politicians to be able to predict what groups will work to support or oppose various policy changes. Moreover, stability in this interface between government and …rms may induce persistence in political and economic institutions or raise the prospects of regulatory capture.
In the next section we describe our data and a number of features of these data that are suggestive of the existence of up-front costs. We then develop our model of …rm behavior and empirical approach in Section 3. We present the results from our baseline estimations as well as a number of robustness checks in Section 4. Section 5 considers evidence on these costs from responses to changes in immigration policy. Section 6 concludes and further discusses the implications of the existence of these entry costs.
Data and Stylized Facts
Our data come from a number of sources. The primary information on …rms' operations comes from Compustat and serves as the platform upon which we build. Information on industry imports comes from the Center for International Data at the University of California at Davis (Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott 2002) . Information on lobbying behavior is possible due to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, which was subsequently modi…ed by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007. This act requires individual companies and organizations to provide a substantial amount of information on their lobbying activities. Since 1996, intermediaries who lobby on behalf of companies and organizations have to …le semi-annual reports to the Secretary of the Senate's O¢ ce of Public Records (SOPR). These reports list the name of each client, the total amount of funds that they have received from each client, and a pre-speci…ed set of general issues for which they lobbied for each client. All …rms with in-house lobbying departments are similarly required to …le reports, stating their total lobbying expenditures directed towards in-house lobbying activities or external lobbyists. Appendix Table A1 shows the list of pre-speci…ed 76 general issues given to each respondent, at least one of which has to be entered. For each general issue, the …ler is also required to list the speci…c issues which were lobbied for during the semi-annual period. Thus, unlike PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures of companies can be associated empirically with very speci…c, targeted policy areas. 7 According to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the term "lobbying activities" refers to "lobbying contacts and e¤orts in support of such contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others." The term "lobbying contact" refers to "any oral or written communication (including an electronic communication) to a covered executive branch o¢ cial or a covered legislative branch o¢ cial". Further, a lobbyist is "any individual (1) who is either employed or retained by a client for …nancial or other compensation; (2) whose services include more than one lobbying contact; and (3) whose lobbying activities constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services during a three-month period." Any person meeting these criteria must register as a federal lobbyist under the Lobbying Disclosure Act.
We compile comprehensive data on lobbying behavior from the websites of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) and the SOPR in Washington D.C. Appendix Figure A1 shows part of the report …led by Microsoft for its lobbying expenditures between January -June 2005. Microsoft lists "immigration" as a general issue and lists "H-1B visas", "L-1 visas", and "PERM (Program Electronic Review Management System)" as speci…c issues under immigration. Besides immigration, Microsoft also lists eight other issues in this report that are not shown. Given our interest in studying …rms' responses to changes in high-skilled immigration policy in Section 5, we went through the speci…c issues listed in each report under the general issue "Immigration" and determined which …rms were lobbying for what. The speci…c issues that are listed are often bills proposed in the U.S. House and Senate. For example, H.R. 5744: Securing Knowledge, Innovation, and Leadership Act of 2006 and S. 1635: L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2004 are bills that we deemed to be relevant for high-skilled immigration. In addition to mentioning speci…c bills, …rms also mention "H-1B visas," "L-1 visas," "high-skilled immigration," and the like in their lobbying reports. We de…ne a …rm to be lobbying for high-skilled immigration in any of these cases. 8 For our analysis of …rms' responses to changes in immigration policy, we also use data on applications for H-1B visas and the ethnic composition of a …rm's workforce. These data are described in Section 5. One central concern in studying the dynamics of …rm lobbying is measurement error in the variable for lobbying status. Under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, lobbying …rms are required to provide a good-faith estimate rounded to the nearest $20,000 of all lobbying-related income in each six-month period. Likewise, organizations that hire lobbyists must provide a goodfaith estimate rounded to the nearest $20,000 of all lobbying-related expenditures in a sixmonth period. An organization that spends less than $10,000 in any six-month period does not have to state its expenditures. If lobbying is not disclosed in such cases, the …gure is reported in the data as zero. Thus as long as a …rm spent $10,000 or more, lobbying status will be correctly observed. Looking at the data, average yearly lobbying expenditures for active …rms are $475,000 and the median value is $164,000. The mean and median expenditures for a …rm the …rst time we observe them lobbying outside of the start of the sample are $111,000 and $74,000. For exiting …rms, these …gures are $86,000 and $54,000. The fact that these entry and exit points are substantially greater than $20,000 suggests that measurement error induced by reporting requirements is likely to be minimal.
We begin by establishing a number of new facts about the lobbying behavior of …rms over time. We consider a balanced panel of U.S.-headquartered …rms over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] that have full sales and employment data. This approach allows us to abstract from the decision to take a company public as well as entry and exit into production. The resulting sample contains 3,260 …rms and 29,340 observations. Table 1 presents a number of descriptive statistics on this sample for all …rms, as well as for …rms that lobby and those that do not. As mentioned above, when we match these data to our Compustat sample, one of the clearest stylized facts that emerges from these …gures is that very few …rms lobby. This is striking, as our data only contain publicly traded companies. These …rms are by and large quite sizable and thus more likely than private …rms to lobby.
We further …nd that both the intensive and extensive margins of lobbying are related to …rm size. The average …rm that lobbies sell roughly four times more than …rms that do not lobby. Employment and assets are similarly three-and-a-half times and two times larger, respectively. While …rms that lobby are only slightly more likely to engage in research and development (R&D), they tend to spend a signi…cantly larger amount on R&D if they do engage in it. These results are consistent with the literature on campaign contributions, re ‡ecting the correlation between lobbying e¤orts and PAC contributions. 9 Amongst …rms that do lobby, there is a correlation of 28% between sales and lobbying expenditures and 19% between employment and lobbying expenditures. The somewhat weaker correlation between …rm size and lobbying on the intensive margin relative to that on the extensive margin is suggestive of the existence of barriers to entry. Indeed, if no such barriers existed, we would expect a signi…cantly stronger correlation between …rm size and lobbying expenditures on the intensive margin.
Another particularly striking feature of the data is the high degree of persistence of …rm lobbying behavior over time. Given that a …rm lobbied last year, the unconditional likelihood of lobbying in the current year is 92%. When we look at this …gure across industries, we …nd very similar results, with almost all two-digit NAICS industries having a persistence rate above 80%. 10 This is also true looking across the …rm size distribution. Partitioning the data into quintiles using the sales distribution of those that lobby, we …nd that the level of persistence across each of the categories is above 88%. Considering changes over time, entry and exit appear partly driven by the bi-yearly election cycle. Interestingly, entry seems to happen in the year before an election, rather than in the year of the election itself. These results suggest that …rms may need to invest early in certain political outcomes. Patterns of exit, in contrast, seem to be unrelated to the election cycle. Figure 1 plots the number of total …rms lobbying as well as the total number of entries 9 See Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder (2002), Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011), and Ludema, Mayda, and Mishra (2010). 10 Igan and Mishra (2011) also …nd evidence of persistence in lobbying behavior in the case of …nancial industry lobbyists. and exits in each year of our sample. Entries and exits are small relative to the overall number of …rms lobbying, re ‡ecting the high level of persistence amongst …rms. The total number of …rms that lobby in our sample increases steadily over time, with entries in each year regularly outnumbering exits. This pattern is consistent with the …ndings of Blanes i Vidal, Dracaz, and Fons-Rosen (2011), who document that total lobbying expenditures were roughly twice as large in 2006 as they were in 1998. The two facts that (i) lobbying status is highly persistent over time and (ii) lobbying is strongly associated with …rm size mean that the intensive margin of lobbying dominates annual changes in lobbying expenditures. Thus, in a typical year 96% of expenditures were made by …rms that lobbied in the previous year. Figure 2 plots the total amount of lobbying expenditures based on which year …rms …rst began lobbying in the sample. The vast majority of resources spent over time are accounted for by …rms that were lobbying at the beginning of the sample, and this remains true even by the end of our sample eight years later. Firms that entered and …rst lobbied in 1999, for example, account for a small amount of expenditures, even after several years.
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Looking at the composition of these expenditures, the average number of issues for which these …rms lobbied is 4.3 and the median is 2. These …gures actually decline somewhat over the sample, such that the increase in total lobbying expenditures found in Figure 2 comes from expansions in the amount spent per issue and the number of …rms that lobby. There is substantial variation in the number of issues lobbied for, even conditional on expenditures. The correlation between these two measures is 55%. Notably, there is signi…cantly less persistence in lobbying for particular issues than there is for overall lobbying status. Fully 60% of …rms that lobby across adjacent years switch the set of issues that they report. Table 2 lists the top ten issues for which these companies reported lobbying. We rank the issues based on a rough estimate of the percentage of total lobbying expenditures going to these issues in the sample. We develop this estimate by dividing the amount spent by a …rm in each year by the total number of issues for which it reported. We then apportion the amount equally to each issue and then aggregate to get a total …gure. Thus, according to this rough estimate, 9.2% of total lobbying expenditures by these …rms is on subjects relating to taxes. We …nd a similar ranking when just considering the frequency of how often lobbying …rms list each issue. 11 We also examined lobbying by associations. Prior work has shown that lobbying through associations tends to be less predominant than individual lobbying. For example, Igan, Mishra and Tressel (2011) show that lobbying expenditures by associations in the …nancial sector is less than 10% of overall lobbying expenditures. Similarly, Bombardini and Trebbi (2011) look at trade lobbying and show that the fraction of sectors engaging predominantly in individual lobbying is higher than those engaged in lobbying through associations. In our dataset, among the 2000 top lobbyists, only 15% are associations. Lobbying through associations could itself be a response to the existence of …xed costs to entering the political process.
Model and Estimation Strategy
To test for the existence of up-front costs associated with beginning to lobby directly, we consider a dynamic model of …rm behavior. Our approach is akin to the models used in the literature on international trade. 12 The essential logic of the model is that if there are no up-front costs to beginning to lobby, one should expect …rms to start and stop lobbying freely. That is, they should optimize based on today's problem and not worry about the future. If there are such costs, however, then there is an option value associated with being involved in the political process that should alter …rms'inter-temporal decisions. We begin by de…ning it (p t ; s it ) as the additional pro…ts that …rm i could make in year t if it lobbies. This level is dependent on exogenous processes p t , such as the business cycle and political climate, and …rm-level state variables s it , such as the capital stock. In de…ning it (p t ; s it ) as the additional pro…t that a …rm could make in period t if it lobbied relative to the state in which it did not lobby, the model is able to accommodate the fact that the …rm has other avenues through which it can a¤ect policy outcomes. This allows us to focus on direct lobbying by …rms. We assume that once they begin, lobbying …rms can alter the amount that they spend costlessly, making it the pro…t-maximizing level of additional pro…ts. We will return to the validity of this assumption in looking at how …rms respond to changes in immigration policy in Section 5.
We further de…ne L it as an indicator variable for whether the …rm lobbies in year t. L ( ) it = fL it j j = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; J i g denotes the …rm's lobbying history where J i is the …rm's age and L (+) it = fL i;t+j j j 0g represents the …rm's choice of lobbying activities in the future. The …rst time that …rms lobby, they have to pay a one-time cost F 0 . 13 In order to account for the possibility that re-entering the process after only a few years of not lobbying is less (or more) costly than entering anew, we de…ne the re-entry cost F j as the expenditure a …rm needs to incur if it stopped lobbying j periods ago and wants to begin again. Related, we
as an indicator for whether the …rm last lobbied j periods ago. Using this expression, we can then write the net period t pro…ts from lobbying for the …rm as
12 See also Dixit (1989) Lincoln and McCallum (2011) , and especially Roberts and Tybout (1997) . 13 The model can easily be extended to include a cost of exiting. The coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status, below, would then also be a function of these costs.
Given this expression, we can write the …rm's dynamic problem. It selects the sequence
it that maximizes the expected present value of payo¤s today subject to the discount rate . Thus the …rm chooses
In a dynamic programming context, we can write the …rm's choice of whether or not to lobby today L it as the value that meets the following condition
where E t ( ) is the expected future value in period t conditional on the information set it . Using our expression for R it L ( ) it from above and comparing the di¤erence in the net bene…ts between choosing L it = 1 versus L it = 0, the …rm will lobby in the current period if
Here the term
represents the option value associated with being able to lobby tomorrow without having to pay the up-front entry cost, which is dependent on expectations about future bene…ts. We can use the expression in (1) to derive an estimating equation to test for the existence of up-front costs that are associated with beginning to lobby. In order to simplify notation, we …rst de…ne
This provides an expression for the expected bene…ts that the …rm plans to receive if it lobbies today. We can then write the …rm's choice as a binary decision problem
This expression collapses if there are no entry costs, and the …rm lobbies if it (p t ; s it ) 0. That is, the …rm decides to lobby solely based on what is most pro…table today.
To proceed with estimation, we need to develop an estimate of it F 0 . These terms are likely to be determined by a number of factors, including …rm characteristics such as …rm size and industry status as well as external time-varying factors such as the election cycle. We thus parameterize it F 0 with the functional form
The term i controls for unobserved time-invariant characteristics. These e¤ects will account for a signi…cant amount of the variation in …rms'industry choices and geographic locations.
t similarly controls for year e¤ects, such as the business cycle and changes in the overall political environment. The term X 0 it accounts for shifts in …rm characteristics, including the logarithms of sales, employees, research and development expenditures, and the level of industry imports. These variables will allow us to account for changes in …rm size and issues related to intellectual property rights. We lag these variables by one period to avoid issues of simultaneity. It is worth noting that the variables in i + X 0 it + t + " it will a¤ect the …rm's choice to lobby based both on how they in ‡uence the current level of pro…ts as well as the option value associated with having already established a presence in the policy making process. Thus, even if lobbying may not yield signi…cant returns today, it may be wise to begin lobbying as an investment in future political outcomes.
This approximation then leads to the estimating equation
where = F 0 and j = F 0 F j . Here we assume that re-entry costs are di¤erent than F 0 for only three years. Our primary object of interest is the coe¢ cient . If is estimated to be di¤erent than zero, our results would suggest that the up-front costs of beginning to lobby are empirically relevant for determining …rms'lobbying decisions over time. Table 3 presents results from estimating the speci…cation in (2) with several di¤erent approaches. The dependent variable in each regression is the indicator L it for whether or not …rm i lobbied in year t. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the …rm in all speci…cations. As a …rst pass, column (1) presents simple correlation results for the …rm characteristics most closely associated with lobbying status. The regression includes controls for three-digit NAICS industry, state, and year …xed e¤ects. State and industry …xed e¤ects correspond to the primary one for the …rm, although operations may exist elsewhere.
Model Estimation Results
Consistent with our results in Table 1 , we …nd statistically signi…cant evidence of an association between lobbying status and sales, employment, and research and development expenditures. The level of industry imports, measured at the four-digit level, demonstrate a positive relationship but are not statistically signi…cant.
14 Our main estimations using the dynamic panel data estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) are found in columns (2)- (8) . 15 In each of our speci…cations, we …nd evidence in favor of the existence of up-front costs to beginning to lobby. The coe¢ cients on lagged lobbying status are economically important and statistically signi…cant. Controlling for other factors, lobbying in the prior period raises the probability that a …rm lobbies in the current period by 88%. Our baseline speci…cation is found in column (2). Interestingly, …rm sales are still a statistically signi…cant predictor of …rm lobbying status even after controlling for past lobbying status, albeit with a smaller magnitude. In column (3) we include additional controls for prior lobbying status, …nding that the costs of re-entering and beginning to lobby again are fairly similar to the costs of entering anew. Column (4) alternatively drops the …rm-speci…c controls X 0 it in equation (2) . The results in both columns yield comparable results to the baseline approach in column (2) .
One concern with the approach that we have taken in columns (2)- (4) is whether the speci…cation fully accounts for free-rider behavior in lobbying. Speci…cally, separately including …rm and time …xed e¤ects in our parameterization may miss changes in industry dynamics over time. In columns (5) and (6), we test the robustness of our approach to these concerns. Column (5) reports estimations that include a measure of total lobbying expenditures by other public companies in the sample in …rm i 0 s three-digit NAICS industry. We include a lagged measure of other-…rm industry lobbying, and the results are similar when using a current period measure. In column (6) we include interacted industry-year …xed e¤ects at the two-digit NAICS industry classi…cation level. This will allow us to capture di¤erences in time e¤ects across industries. In both speci…cations, we …nd similar results for the coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status. These results are not sensitive to de…ning the industry-year …xed e¤ects at the three-or four-digit NAICS level. Including both the measure of other-…rm industry lobbying and industry-year …xed e¤ects also yields similar results. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient on lobbying by other …rms in the industry is positive; we do not …nd evidence of 14 We exclude large conglomerate …rms in Compustat in our baseline speci…cation due to the di¢ culty of assigning them to particular industries. Our results are robust to their inclusion by de…ning these …rms as constituting their own industry. Similar to other studies, we code a minimal value of R&D expenditures for those observations with missing or zero values. We …nd comparable results when excluding this covariate from the estimations. 15 We use lags of order two as instruments. As a check on the validity of the GMM approach, we considered the speci…cation test suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) . These tests fail to suggest any problems with this approach. Roodman (2006) reviews the estimation of dynamic panel data models at length.
lobbying by other …rms crowding out individual …rm lobbying. As an additional robustness check, we found little change in the coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status when controlling for a …rm's within-industry rank in terms of sales or employment over time. This rank is calculated at the two-digit NAICS level. Dropping …rms in industries that were the most lobbying-intensive or concentrated in terms of sales also yielded similar estimates of .
To get an alternative perspective on these results, we also estimate equation (2) with a within …xed e¤ects estimator. This approach is attractive in that it dispenses with some of the assumptions inherent in using the estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) . Given the length of the panel (T = 9), however, we expect the coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status to be biased downward due to the estimation problems raised by Nickell (1981) . The results are reported in columns (7) and (8) . The …rst approach considers lagged lobbying status whereas the second includes additional controls for prior lobbying status. While giving a smaller coe¢ cient on lagged lobbying status, both speci…cations still …nd statistically signi…cant evidence in favor of the existence of up-front costs associated with beginning to lobby. We also …nd statistically signi…cant results with the estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), although these results are more sensitive across variants. Appendix Table 3 reports the results from a number of these robustness checks.
Evidence From Immigration Policy
To get a better sense of the nature of these entry costs and how they a¤ect the dynamics of …rm lobbying behavior, we next study lobbying related to a particular change in U.S. legislation: the expiration of the expansion of the cap for H-1B temporary work visas that occurred in 2004. Looking at how …rms respond to policy shifts o¤ers us another window on the question of whether or not there are barriers to entry for …rms that wish to lobby. If these barriers are su¢ ciently large, entry costs should discourage …rms from beginning to lobby in response to changes in the policy environment. Given the lack of work on the political economy of immigration at the …rm level, we begin by describing the institutional environment and policy change in detail and document several stylized facts about lobbying for immigration for the …rms in our sample. We then proceed with our main analyses of how …rms responded to these policy changes and how these …ndings corroborate our conclusions from the estimations of the model.
The H-1B is the primary visa that governs temporary high-skilled immigration to the United States for work in science and engineering. Immigrant workers are an important source of science and engineering talent for the United States; in the 2000 Census, immigrants accounted for 24% and 47% of all scientists and engineers with bachelors and doctorate educations, respectively. Immigrant scientists and engineers also accounted for more than half of the net increase in the U.S. science and engineering labor force since 1995 in the Current Population Survey (CPS). Many U.S. …rms are very dependent upon immigrants for their science and engineering workers. 16 Since the Immigration Act of 1990 established the program, there has been a limit to the number of H-1B visas that can be issued per year. While other aspects of the program have remained relatively stable, this limit has changed substantially. Figure 3 plots the evolution of the numerical limit on H-1B visa issuances over time. The cap was initially set at 65,000 visas until legislation in 1998 and 2000 signi…cantly expanded the program to 195,000 visas. These changes expired in 2004, and the cap fell back to 65,000 visas. This limit has been binding since, despite being raised by 20,000 in 2006 through an "advanced degree" exemption. change is an attractive laboratory for several reasons. Most important, the expiration o¤ers a natural experiment to study the determinants of lobbying behavior. One of the challenges in the empirical work on lobbying has been to establish a causal link between lobbying behavior and policy changes (e.g., Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2011; Igan, Mishra, and Tressel 2011). Our empirical strategy allows us to better isolate a causal link between changes in policy environments and lobbying behavior. The expiration of legislation isolates changes in policy environments in exogenous ways that are often not possible with the enactment of legislation (e.g., Romer and Romer 2010). In our context, the date of the expiration was set several years before (when the cap was raised), and the issue was not central to …rms during the three preceding years due to full or excess visa supply. When the cap returned to the lower limit, …rms had strong reasons to believe that lobbying on the H-1B issue could in ‡uence policy choices. 17 Finally, studying this policy experiment o¤ers the advantage that we are able to measure …rm sensitivity to high-skilled immigration issues in a precise way that is di¢ cult for many other issues. Our …rst metric of dependency is based upon Labor Condition Applications (LCAs). To hire a foreign worker under the H-1B program, an employer must …rst submit an LCA to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). The LCA lists a speci…c person the …rm wishes to hire, and the primary purpose of the LCA is to demonstrate that the worker in question will be employed in accordance with U.S. law. 18 While data on the H-1B visa issuances are not available, the DOL releases micro-records on all applications it receives, numbering 1.8 million for 2001-2006. These records include …rm names, and we match the …rm names on LCA records to the …rms in our Compustat database. This provides us a measure of …rms' demand for H-1B visas, independent of whether or not a visa is actually granted. Firms seeking a large number of H-1B visas are likely to be sensitive to the downward adjustment of the cap and have reason to lobby for its expansion. Our second metric uses information on the ethnic composition of …rms' science and engineering employees. Firms that employ many immigrant scientists and engineers are also likely to be sensitive to the H-1B program. To estimate this dependency, we obtained data on each …rm's patents and inventors from the U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO). While we are unable to directly discern immigrant status for inventors, we can discern the probable ethnicities of inventors through their names. The basic approach uses the fact that inventors with the surnames Chang or Wang are more likely to be of Chinese ethnicity than of Hispanic ethnicity, while the opposite is true for Martinez and Rodriguez. We use two commercial ethnic databases that were originally developed for marketing purposes, and the name matching algorithms have been extensively customized for the USPTO data. The match rate is 99% and is veri…ed through several quality assurance exercises. The H-1B program draws primarily from India and China, which account for over half of all visas 17 Back-of-the-envelope calculations using the CPS suggest that raising the H-1B cap by 65,000 visas would increase the U.S. science and engineering labor force by about 1.2%, holding everything else constant. This increase would be about half of the median annual growth rate of science and engineering workers, calculated at 2.7% during the period. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) analyze how H-1B population levels a¤ect dependent …rms'invention rates. The cap is only for new H-1B issuances; applications for renewals for another three years are exempt from this limit. Universities, government research laboratories, and certain nonpro…t organizations were exempted from this cap in 2001. 18 The second step in the application process after the LCA is approved is to …le a petition with the USCIS, which makes the ultimate determination about the visa application. Di¤erent employers can simultaneously seek visas for the same prospective employee, although …rms generally make applications only on behalf of committed workers due to the time and legal fees involved. The application fee for a …rm with 26 or more full-time employees was $2,320 in 2008. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) describe the LCA data in further detail. This paper, along with Kerr (2007 Kerr ( , 2008 , also further explains the methodology that we use to construct our second dependency metric based upon ethnic patenting. during our sample period, and the great majority of those related to science and engineering. Firms that employ a large number of Chinese and Indian scientists and engineers are again likely to be very sensitive to the cap's level.
We develop a panel data set of 171 large …rms over 2001-2006 for whom we can construct these measures of dependency on the H-1B visa. This period presents an interesting time to study lobbying behavior, given the expiration of the expansion of the H-1B cap expansion in 2004. The time frame is also partially dictated by the availability of LCA and lobbying data. Our sample construction requires that each …rm appears in the Compustat database in all six years, is headquartered in the United States, and that it accounts for at least 0.05% of total U.S. domestic patents. Re ‡ecting the extreme skewness of the …rm size distribution, this group of 171 …rms accounts for more than $3 trillion of worldwide production annually. Gabaix (2011) notes the particular in ‡uence of very large …rms on aggregate economic outcomes, and our work continues in this vein to describe their e¤orts to shape the political process. Table 4 presents a number of descriptive statistics for these …rms. They are signi…cantly larger and more likely to lobby overall than our initial sample described in Table 1 . About 70% of these …rms lobby in at least one year over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , and 20% lobby for immigration. Re ‡ecting the greater share of high-tech …rms in this sample, roughly threequarters of …rms that lobby for immigration speci…cally lobby for high-skill immigration. On average 18% of …rms' patents are developed by inventors of Indian and Chinese ethnicity, and the typical …rm …les for 94 LCA applications annually. Table 5 presents simple regression evidence documenting the fact that …rms that are more dependent on high-skilled immigration tend to lobby more on this topic. The results are similar when we consider a more general indicator for lobbying on any immigration-related issue, re ‡ecting the fact that the majority of the …rms in our sample that lobby for immigration list high-skilled immigration in the speci…c issues sections of their reports. The speci…c links to our two measures of dependency, however, are sharper for lobbying speci…cally for high-skilled immigration. In falsi…cation tests, there are no signi…cant associations between LCA applications or Chinese and Indian patenting and lobbying for non-immigration related issues like Clean Air and Water, Consumer Product Safety, or Retirement. Figure 5 illustrates how …rms responded to the cap expiration. It plots the fraction of …rms lobbying for high-skilled immigration and the ratio of new H-1B issuances to the cap. These two measures track each other closely, with the fraction of …rms lobbying for highskilled immigration doubling from 6% to 12% between 2003 and 2004. The closeness of these series suggests that lobbying e¤orts for these issues intensi…ed once the H-1B cap was reduced in 2004 and became binding again for the private sector. Our data further indicate that these adjustments were signi…cantly larger by …rms that were already lobbying. Although only half of the …rms that lobbied for high-skilled immigration in 2004 previously lobbied for the issue in 2003, all of them had lobbied for at least one issue in the prior year. Indeed, there is no …rm-year observation in our sample in which the …rm lobbied for high-skilled immigration and did not lobby in the prior year for some other issue. All of the adjustments among these major patenting …rms in response to the policy change were intensive margin adjustments. Looking at the larger sample that we considered in Sections 2-4, all of the …rms that lobbied for immigration in 2004 lobbied for at least one issue in 2003. These patterns are indicative of the substantial barriers to entry in lobbying that we found evidence of in prior sections.
We consider regression evidence on …rms' responses to these policy changes using the speci…cation
This approach quanti…es how …rms adjusted their lobbying e¤orts after the large decline in available visas in 2004. In particular, it captures how this response depends on a …rm's dependence on high-skilled immigrants. L it is an indicator function for whether …rm i lobbied in year t, X it is a set of …rm-level characteristics, HS i;t 0 represents a …rm's initial dependence on high-skilled immigration, and CapBinds t equals one for the years 2004-2006 and is zero otherwise. The covariates in X it include the logarithms of …rm sales, R&D expenditures, and industry level imports. It also includes controls for the types of technologies patented by the …rm and the geographic region of the patented technologies. We lag each of these characteristics by one year to avoid issues of simultaneity, and we …nd similar results using contemporaneous values or excluding the controls entirely. i denotes a vector of …rm …xed e¤ects which controls for unobservable …rm-speci…c characteristics that do not vary over time.
t accounts for global shocks that a¤ect all …rms equally across di¤erent time periods. These …rm and year …xed e¤ects control for the main e¤ects of the interaction ln HS i;t 0 CapBinds t . We measure the dependencies HS i;t 0 only using 2001 data so that they are predetermined, initial values at the start of the sample period. The log transformation ensures that outliers in dependency do not overly in ‡uence our results. Standard errors are clustered at the cross-sectional level of the …rm. Table 6 reports estimations of equation (3) for indicators of lobbying for high-skilled immigration and lobbying overall. In columns (1) and (2) (1) and (2) is to be expected, as the LCA metric represents actual demand for H-1B visas while the ethnic patenting measure is more of a general determinant of visa demand. The former measure will be somewhat sharper as visas are used for other occupations like accountants and consultants.
Reassuringly, these measured e¤ects are also extremely localized to immigration lobbying. Unreported estimations repeat the regressions in columns (1) and (2) for other lobbying issues. Among the twenty top issues on which …rms lobby, the only other issue with an economically or statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient when using the LCA dependency is Science/Technology, which is understandable given its link to the H-1B program. Only two issues are linked to the ethnic patenting measure: Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection with a positive elasticity and Financial Institutions/Investments/Securities with a negative elasticity. These cases appear spurious. Overall, this is a very localized response given that these twenty top issues include lobbying on other labor issues (e.g., unions), patent policy, and trade.
In columns (3) and (4) we perform this analysis on a sample of …rms that lobbied for at least one issue in every year. The similarity of the results to those in columns (1) and (2) suggests that the increase in lobbying for high-skilled immigration came from this subset of …rms. At the same time, when we consider overall lobbying status as the dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) we …nd no evidence of extensive margin adjustments to these policy changes. Consistent with the existence of barriers to entry, these results suggest signi…cant intensive margin adjustments relative to those on the extensive margin. This lack of a response along the extensive margin, along with the strong intensive margin adjustments, demonstrates that barriers to entry played a signi…cant role in shaping how …rms responded to these policy changes. If the costs of beginning to lobby had not played a substantial role, we would have expected signi…cant adjustments along the intensive margin as well as the extensive margin for dependent …rms. This further suggests that these costs also play a large role in shaping the responses of …rms to changes in the policy environment.
19 Table 7 provides a tabular summary of these e¤ects using our two di¤erent measures of H-1B dependency. Columns (1) and (2) These …ndings strongly suggest that the choice to lobby on an issue, once lobbying, depends on the importance of the issue and not the overall scale of lobbying being undertaken by the …rm. They also support the assumptions of our model in Section 3, where adjusting the issues for which the …rm lobbies is relatively easy. While not our central focus, these results also shed light on a debate within the political economy literature. Some authors have suggested that lobbyists are specialists that focus primarily on a particular set of issues. An alternative view is that lobbyists can in ‡uence a wide range of issues, within the constraints of whom they know. Our results suggest that …rms can shift the set of issues that they lobby for relatively easily. This provides suggestive evidence for the 'access'hypothesis as opposed to the 'expertise' hypothesis. These results are consistent with the relatively low levels of persistence regarding which issues …rms lobbied for in our larger …rm sample as well as the recent work of Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011) and Blanes i Vidal, Dracaz, and Fons-Rosen (2011). tion towards …lling this gap. In our panel of publicly-traded, U.S.-headquartered …rms over the period 1998-2006, three stylized facts emerge: (i) few …rms lobby, (ii) lobbying is strongly associated with …rm size, and (iii) lobbying behavior exhibits a high degree of persistence. We develop a dynamic model of …rm behavior to rationalize these …ndings, and show that the existence of entry costs can explain all three …ndings. Our estimations of the model …nd signi…cant evidence for the existence of these costs across a number of approaches. Using a di¤erent approach, we test for the existence of these barriers to entry by considering a natural experiment in the area of immigration policy-the expiration of the increased cap on H-1B visas that occurred in 2004. Using a panel data set of 171 major …rms over 2001-2006 with detailed information on lobbying activities, we …nd that …rms dependent on high-skilled immigration adjusted their lobbying behavior towards immigration-speci…c issues in response to the shock. While the response was very ‡exible among …rms already lobbying, we do not …nd adjustments on the extensive margin-i.e., …rms that were not lobbying on any issue prior to the shock did not start lobbying in response to the shock.
These results support the existence of signi…cant barriers to entry in the process of lobbying. These costs can substantially limit the extensive margin responses of …rms to changes in policy environments. This rigidity due to barriers to entry makes the set of …rms engaged in the lobbying process relatively stable over time. These costs can thus in ‡uence the policy making process and the choices made through the set of actors that lobby on issues. The composition of …rms that are advocating on a speci…c issue are likely to be a non-representative sample of business interests generally. As the high-skilled immigration case illustrates, the group of lobbyists may not even include the voices of all of the most in ‡uenced …rms if entry barriers are large enough. Moreover, both …rms and politicians will be able to reasonably forecast who will support or oppose certain policies among those already engaged in the lobbying process. This mechanism may induce persistence in political and economic institutions. The limited changes in the set of …rms lobbying coupled with the long-term relationships that …rms build with policy makers may also raise the prospects of regulatory capture.
A better understanding of the role that …rms play in policy determination through their lobbying e¤orts is an essential research objective. Continuing with the high-skilled immigration example, there are only a handful of studies that consider the role of …rms in the immigration process or the consequences of policy choices on those …rms. The size of this literature is somewhat surprising given the fact that the H-1B program centers on a …rm-sponsored visa: the …rm identi…es the worker it wishes to hire, applies for a visa on their behalf, potentially applies for a green card on behalf of the worker, and generally has a guaranteed period of time during which the worker is tied to the …rm. Not surprisingly, …rms attempt to de…ne the rules of these procedures. Moreover, they lobby extensively for the capacity to make as many of these hires as they wish. Our understanding of high-skilled immigration policies requires an appreciation of the …rm's roles in policy determination. The same is certainly true, if not more so, in other high pro…le issues like government support to automobile companies and airlines as well as the strength and scope of regulations on …nan-cial services. The existence of entry costs to lobbying-and their impact on …rm dynamics and the composition of …rms lobbying on policy issues-is an important ingredient for future theoretical and empirical work in this vein. Notes: The sample used is the same as that considered for Table 1 . Estimates are constructed by first dividing the amount spent by a … firm in each year by the total number of issues for which it reported. We then apportion the amount equally to each issue and then aggregate across firm-year observations to get a total … figure for each issue. These estimates are then divided by the total level of aggregate expenditures to get percentage estimates. We find a similar ranking when just considering the frequency of how often lobbying … firms list each issue. Table 5 (e.g., lagged sales, lagged R&D expenditures, types of technologies patented, and geographic regions of patenting activity). In Columns (1)- (2) and (5)- (6) regressions include 846 observations, are unweighted, and cluster standard errors by firm. Regressions in Columns (3) and (4) take a similar approach as those in (1) Table 3 .
